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Introduction
This paper aims at analysing the implications of China’s rise to world 
power status and its transition to a greater interdependence in global af-
fairs, which in necessity require a general revision of the country’s diplo-
macy guidelines. In particular, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
is increasing its influence in the world and is expanding its global inter-
ests, it is becoming more and more evident that the traditional stance of 
non-interference in internal affairs of other states (bugansheneizheng 不
干涉内政) is not tenable anymore and needs to be revised. More generally, 
in the last few years, after the decline of American power in the wake of 
the  Global Financial Crisis and the  extraordinary performances played 
instead by  the  PRC, some Chinese scholars have started to challenge 
the  current relevance of Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy prescriptions, 
considering them as out of date and inadequate for China’s newfound in-
ternational status. In particular, Deng’s main dictum “conceal our capac-
ities/keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui 掏光养晦) has increasingly 
been coming under discussion, since China cannot continue to ignore 
the growing number of global challenges and expectations of the interna-
tional community. If China wants to maintain its role and image as a ma-
jor world power, it must live according to its international responsibilities 
and “make some contributions” (dasuo zuowei 打所作为). In other words, 
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the Chinese leadership is called to adjust its low-key position and non-in-
volvement policy and to take a more proactive direction in internation-
al affairs, while at the same time continuing to strive for the realization 
of a harmonious world (hexie shijie 和谐世界). This means that China 
should have the courage to assume greater international responsibilities 
and carry out a “constructive interference policy” when necessary, as it 
has already partially done in dealing with the crisis management of spe-
cific cases, such as those represented by Libya and Sudan.
Nonetheless, there are several obstacles that might inhibit any dra-
matic re-evaluation of the PRC’s official stance in foreign policy, starting 
from its historical memory. In China, much more than in other countries, 
history is magistra vitae. Most Chinese take a negative view of external 
intervention in the light of their historical memory of the suffering inflict-
ed by the imperialist powers during the notorious bainian chiru 百年耻辱, 
that is, the “century of shame and humiliation”. Similarly, the Chinese 
have learned from history that countries who challenged the most pow-
erful state in the international system for the sake of seeking leadership, 
eventually ended in failure (Zhu Liqun, 2010, pp. 46, 52). That is why 
the Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “keeping a low profile and making some 
contributions” continues to be seen, especially within the Chinese com-
munity of international relations scholars, as a wise counsel to follow for 
China in the 21st century (Li Dan, 2010, p. 157).
The Foreign Policy Principles of China
Since the 1950s the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (heping 
gongchu wuxian yuanze 和平共处五项原则), that is: mutual respect for 
each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (huxiang zunzhong 
zhuquan he lingtuwanzheng 互相尊重主权和领土完整); mutual non-ag-
gression (huxiang buqinfan 互不侵犯); non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs (huxiang buganshe neizheng 互不干涉内政); equality and 
mutual benefit (pingdeng huli 平等互利);and peaceful coexistence (heping 
gongchu 和平共处) have constituted the PRC’s fundamental and everlast-
ing norms in foreign policy.1 It is on the  basis of these principles that 
1 Originally proclaimed in 1954 as a part of the agreement between China and 
India (the “Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and 
India”), in 1955 they were incorporated in a modified form in a statement of ten prin-
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China has established diplomatic relations and carried out trade, econom-
ic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges and cooperation with 
the greater majority of countries in the world, and has resolved the bound-
ary issues with most neighbors and maintained peace and stability in its 
surrounding areas. In more recent years, these principles have represented 
the basis of the Beijing modus operandi towards the developing countries 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America which consisted of providing economic 
and technical aid with no political strings attached (bufujiazhengzhitiaoji-
an 不附加政治条件), fostering the emergence of a “China model”.
From the very beginning, the principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs of other states, designed to reflect solidarity with newly independ-
ent post-colonial states and to indicate respect for territorial sovereignty, 
acquired a fundamental role in China’s handling of foreign affairs. This 
fundament was regularly violated by China during the 1960s and 1970s 
when the  communist government was engaged in supporting revolu-
tionary movements across Africa and Asia. It then reassumed a central 
position in the 1980s when China started to pursue the so-called “inde-
pendent foreign policy for peace”, though it was strictly respected only in 
the 1990s when the Beijing government was committed to a low-profile 
foreign policy. At that time China was trying to recover from the post-Ti-
ananmen international isolation and Deng Xiaoping formulated a new 
foreign policy largely inspired by prudence. The so-called “28-characters” 
guidelines (“ershi bazi” fangzhen“二十八字”方针) urged the  country to: 
watch and analyse developments calmly (lengjing guancha 冷静观察); 
secure their our own positions (wenzhu zhenjiao 稳住阵脚); deal with 
changes with confidence (chenzhuo yingfu 沉着应付); conceal our capac-
ities (taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦); be good at keeping a low profile (sha-
nyu shouzhuo 善于守拙); never become the leader (juebu dangtou 绝不当
头); and make some contributions (yousuo zuowei 有所作为). The signifi-
cance of the new foreign policy guidelines was that in that critical moment 
(after the  implosion of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the U.S. 
– unipolar moment) China had better take a “low profile” and concen-
trate on its own affairs while coping with international affairs calmly and 
making full use of advantages, trying to avoid disadvantages. In other 
words, in spite of some speculations, the new guidelines, and especially 
ciples issued at the historic Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Later, they formed 
the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement.
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the warning to taoguang yanghui, often mistranslated as “hiding one’s 
capabilities and biding one’s time”, was not “a calculated call for tempo-
rary moderation until China has enough material power and confidence 
to promote its hidden agenda and challenge the U.S. global dominance”. 
Instead, it was rather an admonition for China to remain modest and low-
key while building a positive image internationally and achieving specific 
gains in order to avoid suspicions, challenges or commitments that might 
undermine the long-standing emphasis on domestic development made 
by China (Wang Jisi, 2011). We should not forget that China’s national 
priorities for domestic and foreign policy were dramatically changed from 
the Mao era to the Deng Xiaoping era. While for Mao the key word was 
“revolution”, with Deng Xiaoping the emphasis was put on “moderniza-
tion”, from which political and social stability depended on (Zhao Quan-
sheng, 1996, p. 4).
In that crucial phase, the doctrine of non-interference started to be 
perceived by the Chinese government as the core of sovereignty, used to 
provide justification for its adherence to a strict view of sovereignty which 
rejected interference in the  international affairs in the name of human 
rights or humanitarian interventions as had frequently been adopted 
by many Western countries, starting from the United States. The  con-
temporary growing integration of the  PRC into the  international com-
munity through, among others, its support of the  major international 
institutions; its participation to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO); 
the abandonment of the previous aversion to multilateralism which facil-
itated the entrance to nearly all multilateral and regional organizations 
and associations, just served the national interests of the country and did 
not imply any endorsement of the liberal principles which underlie many 
institutions such as the UN and the WTO.
The PRC’s U-Turn in Foreign Policy
Both the  Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the  Deng 
Xiaoping low-profile guidelines had never been seriously questioned un-
til recently. Rather, the prudent and pacific diplomatic strategy adopted 
by  Beijing in the  last decades brought to several diplomatic successes, 
both in the surrounding areas and in the global arena. China has gradu-
ally emerged as a “responsible” country, and in the meantime the success 
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of its developmental path along with the peculiarities of Beijing’s modus 
operandi contributed to make it a “model” to which one can refer to (Con-
giu, Onnis, 2013, pp. 72–5).
However, since the end of the 2000s, the PRC has undertaken a kind 
of U-turn from a cautious, low-profile, responsibility-shirking posture to 
a  more confident and assertive one. Besides the  brilliant performances 
played by  the  Chinese government which facilitated the  rapid recovery 
of the country from the global financial crisis, many factors contributed 
to fuel this tendency: the growing energy consumption needs; the rising 
nationalism (further fostered by  the  so-called dissatisfaction literature)2; 
the incipient leadership transition; and the distrust of the Obama admin-
istration (strictly related to some specific episodes which hurt China’s na-
tional interests, such as the decisions to meet the Dalai Lama at the White 
House in July 2011 and to sell a new substantial arms package to Taiwan 
in September 2011). Whatever the causes that may have contributed to 
such a shift in Chinese diplomacy the most relevant point for the present 
analysis is that, as the global economic crisis spread across the West in 
the period just after the Beijing Olympics, new voices in China, both unof-
ficial and quasi-official, began to challenge the thesis of China’s ‘peaceful 
and low-key path’. Some of its opponents started to contend that the main 
objective of China should not be economic prosperity but power itself. Ad-
ditionally, they also voiced the opinion that in order to become powerful 
and achieve international recognition it should not only be concerned with 
economic development but also with military power. They were rather in 
favour of a more assertive stance, especially towards the United States, 
accordingly to its new gained status (Zhu Liqun, 2010, pp. 8–9).
As a matter of fact, the maintenance of the low-profile diplomatic pos-
ture and the continuing respect of the non-interference principle started 
to be increasingly complicated by China’s expanding global interests and 
the subsequent multifaceted challenges the country had to cope with. As 
pointed out by Wang Yizhou, from the Beijing University, one of the most 
dramatic changes that occurred in Chinese foreign policy is strictly related 
2 Symbolized mainly by the two bestsellers Zhongguobugaoxing: da shidai, da mubiaoji 
women de neiyouwaihuan 中国不高兴大时代, 大目标及我们的内忧外患 [China is Un-
happy: the Great  Era; the Grand Goal, and our National Anxieties and External Chal-
lenges] and Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguoshidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei 
中国梦后美国时代的大国思维与战略  定位 [China Dream: Great Power Thinking and 
Strategic Posture in the Post-American era], published  in 2009 and 2010 respectively.
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to the fact that China now has to protect the interests and safety of its cit-
izens around the world (Leonard, 2012, p. 21). Nowadays, more than 70 
million Chinese citizens travel abroad every year that includes not only 
official representatives but also ordinary citizens, such as students, mi-
grant workers, businessmen, and tourists, while on the eve of the launch 
of the reform and opening-up policies, they were only about 9,000 (ibid., 
p.  107). In addition, every year China sends about 5 million workers 
abroad, mostly in geopolitically insecure regions characterized by social 
and political instabilities and civil wars where other countries refuse to 
go or dare not to venture (Duchâtel, Bill, 2012). Consequently, the Chi-
nese government is under mounting pressure, particularly among Chi-
nese bloggers3, to provide for their off-shore security. This is not a simple 
task since, as mentioned above, China’s state-owned companies and 
the Chinese citizens are often based in some of the most difficult trouble 
spots in the world. This would require a  vigorous stance from Beijing, 
that the Chinese government is reluctant to adopt given its traditional 
adherence to the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
countries. In these circumstances, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
China to continue to abide by its long-standing foreign policy principles, 
in particular its non-interference policy, even if it continues to remain 
part of the official rhetoric.
“Non-interference”: aluxury not affordableanymore
It is the increasingly recurring “hostagecrisis” (renzhi weiji 人质危机) 
that especially affects Chines ecitizens working abroad and one that has 
recently triggered a hot debate about the continuing value of the non-in-
terferencedoctrine. According to Jian Junbo, from the Fudan Institute of 
International Studies, in the  past five years over 100 Chinese citizens 
have been kidnapped or attacked in numerous countries such as Afghan-
istan, Cameroon, Columbia, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nigeria, Su-
dan, Thailand and Yemen (JianJunbo, 2012). At the  end of the 2000s, 
3 Microblogging can be considered as one of the most relevant legacies of the Fourth 
Generation of Chinese leaders. Almost non-existent at the  beginning of the  Hu-
Wen decade, by the end of June 2012, China had become the country with the most 
microblog users in the world. According to the 2012 Blue Book of New Media, released 
by the China Social Science Academic Press, there are currently over 274 million users 
(Liu Sheng, 2012)..
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China was second only to the U.S. in the world in terms of accidents 
among overseas citizens (Fang Wei, 2008, p. 43).
Kidnapping represents quite an unprecedented challenge for Beijing, 
which in part explains the inability of the Chinese government to devel-
op a comprehensive strategy to protect Chinese citizens and companies 
in times of tumult. Actually, China has historically relied on interna-
tional organizations to help its citizens abroad, as it happened in 2007 
when the International Committee of the Red Cross negotiated the re-
lease of 7 oil workers held hostage in Ethiopia (“Rebels ‘release’ Chinese 
hostages”, 2007).
The growth in crises for Chinese citizens abroad is related to several 
factors, starting from the growing numbers of Chinese working abroad, 
which increases the  probability for them to be kidnapped or attacked, 
especially in those states where political and social instability prevails 
(which actually coincide with those emerging markets where the PRC has 
the main economic interests). For example, more than 1 million Chinese 
citizens are currently working in African countries, up from 100,000 less 
than a decade ago (Zenn, 2012). The way the Beijing government deals 
with its relations with these countries also contributes to making Chinese 
citizens vulnerable as targets. In most cases it develops relations only with 
the ruling parties, while it neglects to foster ties with the opponent forces 
or rebel groups and, more generally, with the civil societies as a whole. 
Another relevant factor pertains to the relatively low levels of security that 
increase the possibility for Chinese workers to become an easy target for 
ransom and thus an alluring target for kidnappers. Actually, in order to 
limit costs, the Chinese state owned companies usually require workers 
to live in special encampments where their security staff is often inexperi-
enced and underequipped (ibid.). In these conditions, the Chinese workers 
are often adrift and left at the mercy of the local events.
As a rising power with growing global interests, China cannot afford 
this persisting condition and the Chinese government is actually under 
growing pressure in order to develop a flexible involvement strategy to 
protect its overseas interests and those of its citizens working abroad. So, 
on the one side, there is concern about how the “overseas interests” of 
China can be protected in the event of political and economic instability. 
On the other, the Chinese leadership is getting lot of pressure to reevalu-
ate the non-interference principle as it does not appear to be a policy ap-
propriate for a global power with growing international “responsibilities”.
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The concept of “overseas citizen protection” (haiwai gongmin baohu 
海外公民保护), which refers to the  efforts made by  a  range of Chinese 
institutions to assist or evacuate Chinese citizens abroad, first came to 
prominence almost a decade ago. To be more exact, the idea came about 
in 2004 when deadly attacks killed 14 Chinese workers in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Duchâtel, Bill, 2012). Since then, the number of attacks 
on overseas Chinese citizens has grown significantly. Between 2006 and 
2010, a  total of 6,000 people were evacuated from upheavals in Chad, 
Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste 
and Tonga. In 2011 alone, China had to evacuate 48,000 of its nation-
als from Egypt, Libya and Japan. In October 2011, 13 Chinese merchant 
sailors were murdered on the Mekong River in Northern Thailand. A few 
months later, in two separate kidnappings more than 20 workers were 
taken hostage by  rebels in the  South Kordofan Province of Sudan and 
by Bedouin tribesmen in the Sinai Peninsula within the borders of Egypt, 
respectively. The list could continue with numerous other less publicized 
crises involving overseas Chinese citizens, often motivated by local resent-
ments of Chinese investments or the management of those investments. 
The last one in order of occurrence took place on August 5, 2012, in Zam-
bia, where some local miners killed their Chinese manager by pushing 
a mine trolley at him during a pay protest at a coal mine (“Zambian miner 
skill Chinese manager”, 2012).
In the past, China has adopted some important, albeit insufficient, 
measures in order to give more guarantees to its citizens working abroad. 
For example, in 2006 the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a  Bureau 
of Consular Protection (Lingshi baohu chu 领事保护处) within the De-
partment of Consular Affairs, to handle and coordinate consular pro-
tection work. In November 2011 the China Consular Service Network 
was launched (Zhongguo lingshi fuwuwang 中国领事服务网) in order to 
disseminate nonstop security information through a website;at the same 
it concluded an agreement with Chinese mobile phone operators to en-
sure that Chinese nationals receive a  text message with basic security 
information upon arrival in a foreign country (Duchâtel, Bill, 2012; Fang 
Wei, 2008). More recently, the State Council issued a new set of rules 
to regulate the export of labor and protect the  ights of workers abroad, 
the so called “Control regulations of Foreign Labor Cooperation” (Haiwai 
Laodong Hezuo Guanli Tiaoli 海外劳动合作管理条例), which were offi-
cially implemented on August 1, 2012. Interestingly, the new regulations, 
which consist of 53 articles, emphasize a “soft” tact towards protecting 
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workers, rather than a  “hard” approach that would involve the deploy-
ment of the military. A significant provision included in art. 12, for ex-
ample, requires companies to arrange for laborers to gain knowledge of 
the foreign languages where they work, as well as for companies to teach 
their workers about the relevant laws, religions and customs of the host 
country before deploying them abroad.
In light of these considerations, there are numerous analysts in China 
who believe that the principle of non-interference is becoming a sort of 
“burden”. This is due to the fact that the fast growing economy of the PRC 
and the consequent growing need for energy, resources and foreign mar-
kets, forces Beijing to engage ever more deeply with supplier and customer 
countries, no matter how stable or unstable they may be. In these condi-
tions, the constant persistence to adopt anon-interference approach risks 
harming the national interests of the country. Put in another way, China 
has become too “big” to maintain its traditional policy of non-interfer-
ence and its aversion to economic sanctions; too “big” to preserve friendly 
diplomacy towards international pariahs such as Sudan, Iran and North 
Korea; and too “big” to continue to fall back on its developing country 
status as a way to resist making sacrifices to stabilize the world economy 
and mitigate the  environmental damage (Christensen, 2011, p. 57). In 
summation, “non-interference” is becoming a “luxury” that China cannot 
probably afford anymore.
For the time being the Chinese leadership perceives “non-interference” 
as a “dilemma” given the lack of consensus of how to balance the growing 
Chinese overseas interests and international responsibility with this tra-
ditional doctrine.
Besides the  lack of consensus, there are several factors that work 
against any dramatic reevaluation of their official stance. Firstly, the lack 
of capabilities and resources. The coercive tools of the PRC have still not 
been fully modernized and the country is not ready to project its “hard” 
power in the world. So far, the largest mission that China has deployed 
to protect its workers abroad came in early 2011 when it had to evacuate 
more than 35,000 citizens from Libya after the eruption of anti-govern-
ment protests and rebellions. Actually, although it was simply a rescue 
mission with no shots fired, it revealed both the capabilities and deficien-
cies of China in protecting their national power far from home. The rescue 
operation marked, in fact, the first time China deployed military assets 
to protect citizens of the PRC overseas. Nonetheless, military operations 
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in far-flung theaters remain logistically difficult for China, especially as 
it lacks the extensive intelligence networks in developing countries that 
the  Western countries have taken several decades to build. Moreover, 
the  expeditionary military capabilities of China are currently limited, 
even if it must be recognized that the Chinese military is making great 
efforts to become an expeditionary force. Theanti-piracy deployment to 
the Gulf of Aden in 2009 and the use of naval and air assets to support 
the evacuation from Libya in 2011 have demonstrated a real potential 
in this arena (Collins, 2011). China is gradually building up a  cadre 
of soldiers with significant international operating experience gained 
through participations in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), many 
of which either took or are still taking place in locations with a security 
environment similar to areas where the PLA might be called to inter-
vene in the future to support the evacuation of other overseas Chinese 
nationals (Lecarte, 2013). Another factor is related to the  firm belief 
that non-interference has been a  valuable policy tool in building pre-
cious relations with African and other developing countries exhausted 
by the prescriptions and the conditions imposed by the Western coun-
tries. The non-interference policy is actually one of the most appreciated 
pillars of the so-called “Beijing consensus”. If China changes its mind 
and starts to accept the principle of intervention, not only its influence 
on the third world countries may well be jeopardized, but also it may 
face more international pressure to shoulder greater responsibilities to 
which it currently does not have sufficient capacity. Strictly related to 
this, there is the “comprehensible” worry that an interventionist China 
might be perceived as a new “colonialist” power, contributing to con-
firming the foreign perceptions that the economic expansion of China 
is imperialist in nature, and at the same time further fostering the infa-
mous “China threat” theory (Zhongguoweixielun 中国威胁论).
Last but not least, another important factor that might inhibit any 
serious intervention to protect Chinese citizens abroad resides in the lack 
of coordination between institutional players. Actually, the  growing 
complexity of the  current foreign policy making process in China, due 
to the cacophony of voices and the downgrading of the Foreign Ministry 
by other governmental and local agencies which pursue their own inter-
ests, represents one of the most crucial challenges the new leadership is 
called to cope with (Jakobson, 2013, pp. 13–4).
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The “Creative Involvement” Concept of Wang Yizhou
In line with these considerations, some Chinese scholars have devel-
oped new paradigms to describe how China could be more active and play 
a constructive role in international relations, without a complete denial 
or giving up of its traditional foreign policy principles. In particular, Wang 
Yizhou coined the concept of “creative involvement” (chuang zao xing ji-
eru 创造性介入), directly inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of “cre-
ative destruction” (chuang zao xing pohua i 创造性破坏) that describes 
how China could further expand its role in international affairs or support 
international interventions through the  engagement with international 
norms rather than by narrow economic self-interest.
Wang Yizhou’s starting point is that China is now experiencing the im-
plications of being a great power. Along with the increasing responsibili-
ties related to its growing interdependence in international affairs and its 
increased physical presence across the world, China also has to respond 
to the higher expectations of the international community. Consequent-
ly, it cannot afford to continue to remain a free rider of the international 
system; rather, it is called on to change the course of its diplomacy and 
give its own contribution to the world, shouldering bigger responsibilities. 
However, Wang does not lean towards a tout court, denying the traditional 
foreign policy principles. On the contrary, he agrees that Deng Xiaoping’s 
main dictum of “keeping a low profile” should not be changed. Actually, 
in his view, the idea of “creative involvement” represents an enrichment 
of Deng’s policies (which proclaim the necessity to “keep a low profile” 
and also “do something”). In fact, it stresses a new and proactive attitude 
(jiji taidu 积极态度) with a stronger sense of participation in international 
affairs that should characterize the new diplomatic posture of China.
Although advocating an active participation in foreign affairs, Wang’s 
new diplomatic concept differs essentially from interventionism. First 
of all, it calls for active contact and involvement instead of intervention 
by force (as it is usually the case in Western interventionism). According 
to Wang, “creative involvement” should be conducted on the basis of in-
ternational legitimation. This implies the  respect of some fixed princi-
ples, that is: obeying the UN Charter; being invited by the local people or 
a majority of political parties in the state concerned; and conforming to 
the wishes of most of its neighboring countries. Furthermore, the strategy 
should be carried out according to Chinese capabilities after cautious de-
liberation, and only when dealing with affairs concerning its vital or “core 
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interests” (hexinliyi 核心利益).4 From this point of view, Wang Yizhou’s 
position reflects the  ideas of the  so-called “selective multilateralist” 
school (one of the seven schools of thinking within the Chinese interna-
tional relations community). According to this school of thought, China 
should selectively expand its global involvements, commensurate with its 
newfound position and power, though only on issues that directly involve 
the national security interests of China (Shambaugh 2011, pp. 17–20). 
Last but not least, Wang’s concept stresses diplomatic mediation and eco-
nomic assistance (which pertain to the  “soft power” realm) instead of 
a military-first approach.
In his book specifically dedicated to the new concept and to its implica-
tions for the Chinese diplomacy, entitled Chuangzao xingjieru. Zhongguo 
waijiao xinqu xiang 创造性介入中国外交新取向  [Creative Involvement. 
A new direction in China’s diplomacy], Wang presents eight case studies 
from recent Chinese diplomacy (addressing both global concerns and Chi-
nese vital interests) where some elements of “creative involvement” were 
at play. The scope of the presented case studies include examples such as: 
encouraging the political reform in Myanmar after the 2007 crackdown; 
providing massive humanitarian aid to Sudan; creating the  “Six-Party 
talks” to contain the North Korean nuclear ambitions; and the more re-
cent evacuation from Libya (Wang Yizhou, 2011, chap. 2). The last one 
is particularly interesting as the  evacuation of more than 35,000 Chi-
nese citizens in a relatively short period of time (from February to March 
2011), revealed not only the  growing capabilities of China in overseas 
citizen protection, but also Beijing’s good relations with related countries, 
outstanding negotiating ability, strong financial power and impressive 
ability of mobilization, organization, and coordination. In fact, the Libyan 
evacuation mission, referred to in Chinese both as guojia xingdong 国家行
动 (national action) and guojia jiushou 国家救授 (state rescue), was jointly 
conducted by  the Chinese military, some government departments and 
the companies involved in the African country. According to the author, 
the Libyans rescue is a case of “creative involvement” that is “worth ana-
4 State Councilor Dai Bingguo(in charge of international relations) publicly defined 
the general elements of China’s core interests in July 2009, during a session of the 
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), including three components: 
1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security (weihujibenzhidu he 
guojiaanquan 维护基本制度和国家安全); 2) preserving national sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity (guojiazhuquan he lingtuwanzheng 国家主权和领土完整); and 
3)  safeguarding the continued stable development of China’s economy and society 
(jingjishehui de chixu wending fazhan 经济社会的持续稳定发展) (Swaine, 2011).
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lysing” as it created several records in the diplomatic history of the PRC. 
In fact it was the first time the PRC evacuated citizens from a conflict-rid-
den foreign country using land, air and ocean passages; it was the first 
time the Chinese government rented civil aircraft, foreign ships and planes 
on a large scale; the first time it ferried its citizens to third countries be-
fore repatriating them; and the first time embassy officials issued emer-
gency travel documents in order to prove the identities of the evacuates 
(ibid., pp. 74–5). Actually, the official media referred to the Libya mission 
as “the  largest and most complicated overseas evacuation ever conduct-
ed by  the Chinese government since 1949” (Wang Guanqun, 2011). At 
the same time, the rescue operation in Libya represented for the Chinese 
leadership an “unusual” combination of challenges, contributing to clearly 
show China “the burdens of being a great power” and the growing unsuit-
ableness of its non-interference posture (Parello-Plesner, 2011).
Similarly, the patient and meticulous work of the PRC implemented 
in Sudan starting from the second half of the 2000s constitute another in-
teresting example of “creative involvement” by Chinese diplomacy, which 
helped the Beijing government to maintain good relations with both Su-
dan and South Sudan (after the referendum that sanctioned its independ-
ence in January 2011), safeguarding its economic interests in the country, 
on the one side, and partly “sacrificing” its hallowed doctrine of non-inter-
vention, on the other (Rafferty, 2010; Zhang Chun 2012).
The fact that the case studies presented by Wang are mainly related to 
crisis management does not imply that the “creative involvement” should 
be limited only to difficult situations. According to the author it should 
instead become the rule in the handling of ordinary diplomatic affairs. In 
other words China needs to play a constructive role in addressing topical 
issues globally and regionally and in tackling various global challenges 
(many of which clearly require an intervention policy from China in order 
to be solved). This means that China should have the courage to assume 
more international responsibilities and carry out a “constructive interfer-
ence” policy, when necessary.
Conclusions
China’s foreign policy has faced many important challenges in the last 
decades. One of the most dramatic ones is related to the growing presence 
of its citizens around the world that the Chinese government has the duty 
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to protect. Such a duty is becoming increasingly urgent since the overseas 
Chinese have become one of the most preferred targets for kidnappers, 
not only in Africa, but also in some Asian and Latin American countries. 
In these circumstances, the  “non-interference” stance of the  PRC that 
has worked well in the past does not appear tenable anymore. As a rising 
power with growing global interests China needs to develop a flexible in-
volvement strategy to protect its overseas interests. This does not imply 
the adoption of an opportunistic approach. Rather, China should develop 
a strategy that is complimentary to its non-interference policy based on 
the principles of the UN charter. At the same time, it should aim to win 
the  respect of foreign countries by  playing its due role as a  major and 
responsible country, while also working jointly with other countries to 
meet global challenges. This will not only help China to consolidate an 
image as a responsible major power, but it will also satisfy its own needs 
to be integrated into the  current international system and play a  con-
structive role. However, there are several obstacles that might encumber 
any dramatic revaluation of the  official international behavior towards 
a more responsible major power willing to consider the downgrading of 
its non-interference policy when necessary, and play a more constructive 
role in foreign affairs. The most urgent and with potential far-reaching 
consequences is probably the lack of coordination among the multiple ac-
tors (institutional and not) that strive to influence Chinese foreign policy 
to the detriment of not only the Foreign Ministry but also the national 
interests of the country.
References
Christensen, Th. J. (2011). “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Bei-
jing’s Abrasive Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, n. 2, Mar/Apr, pp. 54–67.
Collins, G. (2011). “China’s Military Gets Expeditionary”, The Diplomat, April 15, URL: 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/04/15/china%E2%80%99s-military-gets-expedition-
ary/?all=true (accessed 15 April, 2012).
Congiu, F., Onnis, B. (2013) “The China Model”, in Baracani E. and Di Quirico R. (ed.) 
Alternatives to Democracy. Non-Democratic Regimes and the Limits to Democracy 
Diffusion in Eurasia, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing.
Duchâtel, M., Bates, G. (2012). “Overseas citizen protection: a growing challenge for Chi-
na”, February 12, URL: http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/february12 (ac-
cessed 15 April, 2012).
Fang Wei (2008). “ZhongguogongminzaiFeizhou de anquanyulingshibaohuwenti” (On Se-
curity and Consular Protection of Chinese Citizens in Africa), Zhejiang shifandax-
uexuebao [Journal of Zhejiang Normal University], vol. 33, n. 5, pp. 43–49.
57The New “Selective Diplomacy” of the People’s Republic of China…
Jakobson, L. (2013). “China’s foreign Policy Dilemma”, Lowy Institute for Internation-
al Policy, February, URL: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/jakobson_chinas_for-
eign_policy_dilemma_web3_use_this.pdf (accessed 5 April, 2012).
Jian Junbo. (2012). “Beijing’s New Overseas Imperatives”, Asia Times Online, February 
17, URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NB17Ad01.html (accessed 15 Febru-
ary, 2012).
Lecarte, J. (2013). “China’s role in UN peacekeeping operations”, Library Briefing, April 22, 
URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/120387/
LDM_BRI (2013)120387_REV1_EN.pdf (accessed 25 April, 2012).
Leonard, M. (2012) “China 3.0”, European Council on Foreign Relations, November, 
Available: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR66_CHINA_30_final.pdf[15 Dec 2012).
Li  Dan. (2010). ZhongguoGuojiGuanxiXuehui 2010 niannianhuizai Lanzhou zhaokai 
(China’s international relations society 2010 annual meeting in Lanzhou Review), 
Waijiao Pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 2, pp. 156–7.
Liu Sheng. (2012). “China tops world in microblog user numbers: report”, Global 
Times, October 9, URL: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/737076.shtml (accessed 
15 April, 2012).
Parello-Plesner, J. (2011). “Libya shows China the burdens of being a great power”, East 
Asia Forum, March 6, URL: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/06/libya-shows-
china-the-burdens-of-being-a-great-power/ (accessed 15 April, 2012).
Rafferty, T. (2010). “China’s Doctrine of Non-interference Challenged by Sudan’s Referen-
dum”, China Brief, vol. 10, n. 25, December, pp. 18–13.
“Rebels ‘release’ Chinese hostages” (2007). People’s Daily Online, April 30, URL: http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200704/30/eng20070430_371050.html (accessed 
15 April, 2012).
Shaumbaugh, D. (2011). “Coping with a conflicted China”, The Washington Quarterly, 
vol. 34, n. 1, Winter, pp. 7–27.
State Council of People’s Republic of China (2012), Haiwai Laodong Hezuo Guanli 
Tiaoli, URL: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012–06/11/content_2157905.htm (accessed 
15 March, 2012).
Swaine, M. (2011). “China’s Assertive Behavior. Part One ‘On core interests’”, China Lead-
ership Monitor, vol. 34, Winter.
Wang Guanqun. (2011). “35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya”, 
Xinhuanet, March 3, URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/chi-
na/2011–03/03/c_13759456.html (accessed 15 April, 2012).
Wang Jisi. (2011). “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its 
Way”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, n. 2, Mar/Apr., pp. 68–79.
Wang Yizhou. (2011). Chuangzaoxingjieru. Zhongguowaijiaoxinquxiang [Creative Involve-
ment. A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy], Beijing: Beijing daxuechubanshe.
Zenn, J. (2012). “Chinese, overseas and insecure”, Asia Times Online, September 6, URL: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NI06Ad02.html 2012 (accessed 15 April, 
2012).
Zhang Chun. (2012). “China’s relations with Two Sudans: From ‘One Country, Two Sys-
tems’ to ‘Two Countries, One system’”, Global Review, Winter, pp. 3–6, URL: http://
www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Global-Review---2012-winter.pdf  (ac-
cessed 15 April, 2012).
Zhao Quansheng. (1996). Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage 
Approach, USA: Oxford University Press.
Zhu Liqun. (2010). “China’s Foreign Policy Debates”, Chaillot Papers, n. 121, September.
